When Bitcoin is booming, mining appears to be a no-brainer. Racks of specialized machines churn through mathematical problems, printing digital money out of thin air, or so it seems from the outside. However, behind the promise of reward lies a business model built on razor-thin margins and an ever-shifting target.
Bitcoin mining is competitive. Companies compete in a global race defined by energy prices, hardware cycles, regulation, and sheer computational firepower. A miner’s profitability depends on how many hashes it can generate per dollar of electricity—an equation that changes by the day. Add in geopolitical risks, the four-year Bitcoin halving cycle that cuts rewards in half, and aggressive public market pressures, and it becomes clear: this is not a business for the faint of heart.
Over the past decade, a long list of mining companies have gone bust — some in a flash, others slowly under the weight of bad timing or overreach. The firms on this list didn’t all fail for the same reason, but they all collapsed under pressure that mining insiders know too well.
Here are ten Bitcoin mining companies that attempted to scale the mountain but didn’t succeed.
Name | Location | CEO | Year of Failure | Sector/Product |
---|---|---|---|---|
Compute North | Minnesota, USA | Dave Perrill | 2022 | Infrastructure/Hosting |
Celsius Mining | USA | Alex Mashinsky | 2022 | Mining arm of crypto lender |
Core Scientific | Texas, USA | Mike Levitt | 2022 | Public BTC Mining |
Rhodium Enterprises | Texas, USA | Nathan Nichols | 2024 | Mining/Infrastructure |
GHash.io | UK | N/A (BitFury backed) | 2016 | Mining Pool |
Envion AG | Switzerland | Matthias Woestmann | 2018 | Mobile Mining Units |
Butterfly Labs | Missouri, USA | Jeff Ownby (COO) | 2014 | ASIC Hardware |
Hashfast | California, USA | Eduardo deCastro | 2014 | ASIC Hardware |
CoinTerra | Austin, USA | Ravi Iyengar | 2015 | ASIC Hardware |
GAW Miners | Connecticut, USA | Josh Garza | 2015 | Cloud Mining + Paycoin |
Compute North provided hosting services for large-scale mining operations, handling equipment deployment and maintenance so that miners could focus on their rigs.
By 2022, it had data centers across Texas, Nebraska, and South Dakota and counted Marathon Digital (now MARA) and Compass Mining among its clients. However, behind the scenes, the company had borrowed heavily to build new facilities, a move that clashed directly with Bitcoin’s price collapse and a surge in power costs.
By September 2022, it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, citing over $500 million in liabilities. CEO Dave Perrill stepped down but remained on the board. The company eventually sold major assets to Generate Capital and Foundry Digital.
Celsius was already in trouble when its mining division fell. The broader Celsius Network froze user withdrawals in mid-2022 and entered bankruptcy shortly after. But Celsius Mining had been planning to go public, right before the parent company’s problems imploded that dream.
The mining arm had over 43,000 ASIC miners and was building a 280 MW facility in Texas. It had even borrowed $75 million from mining financier B. Riley to fund growth. But as Bitcoin prices dropped and its parent company collapsed under regulatory scrutiny, the subsidiary fell with it.
CEO Alex Mashinsky resigned and was later sued by regulators. The mining division was put up for auction to recoup creditor funds.
Core Scientific went public via SPAC in 2021 and quickly became one of the largest publicly traded mining firms. It operated out of Texas, Kentucky, and Georgia, with a combined hash rate representing nearly 10% of Bitcoin’s US network share.
But 2022 was unforgiving. BTC lost 64% of its value that year. Electricity prices went up. The company’s energy bills exceeded its mining revenue. In December 2022, it filed for bankruptcy with $1.3 billion in debt.
CEO Mike Levitt remained in his position through the restructuring. In 2023, the company began paying down debt using restructured agreements with creditors, and by mid-2024, it was inching toward recovery. As of June 2025, the company had one of the leading Bitcoin mining stocks globally.
Rhodium Enterprises tried to run a tight operation, focusing on efficient mining infrastructure based in Texas. It was founded in 2020 and had grand ambitions. By 2022, it filed for an IPO, valuing itself at around $1.7 billion.
But those plans stalled. The IPO never went through, and by 2024, the firm had defaulted on a $54 million loan to Generate Lending. It filed for Chapter 11 in August of that year.
CEO Nathan Nichols has since remained quiet. The company’s court filings revealed disputes with key creditors and a struggle to stay afloat in a volatile market where even the most efficient operations aren’t safe. Nathan Nichols later resigned as co-CEO in December 2024, following the sale of the Temple mining site and facing lawsuits from creditors alleging fraud.
GHash.io wasn’t a company in the traditional sense; it was a mining pool. But for a brief moment in 2014, it held more than 50% of the Bitcoin network’s total computing power. That triggered panic.
If a single pool controls more than 50%, it opens the door to a potential 51% attack, where the pool could manipulate the network. The community voiced concerns, and miners began pulling out.
The operators decided to shut the pool down by 2016. It was a quiet exit, but one with lasting impact. Today, no mining pool dares to grow too dominant without facing social pressure and technical decentralization mechanisms.
Envion AG took a different approach. Based in Switzerland, it designed mobile mining units housed in shipping containers, which were designed to relocate to where electricity was cheapest, typically to hydro or wind farms.
Its 2018 ICO raised over $100 million, making it one of the largest at the time. But almost immediately after launch, internal disputes between the founders and executives escalated. Lawsuits followed, and the Swiss regulators stepped in, ultimately causing the whole structure to fall apart.
By the end of 2018, Envion was liquidated. CEO Matthias Woestmann exited amid legal turmoil. The company never deployed its tech at scale, and the mobile mining concept remains underused in mainstream mining today.
Butterfly Labs (BFL) began selling ASIC miners when the market was still in its infancy. It was an early mover but didn’t ship its products on time, if at all. Customers who pre-ordered in Bitcoin never got refunds.
The FTC filed a complaint in 2014, accusing BFL of engaging in deceptive business practices. The company entered receivership, and most of its assets were frozen. COO Jeff Ownby later admitted in court documents that the delays were longer than projected, but denied malice.
BFL’s fall served as an early warning about trusting new mining rigs manufacturers. Trust, in this space, evaporates quickly.
California-based Hashfast promised ASIC chips that could mine Bitcoin faster and more efficiently. It raised millions from early buyers in 2013, but the chips never arrived on time, and when they did, they were often obsolete.
In 2014, Hashfast filed for bankruptcy. The company owed over $40 million and had no realistic means of repaying its customers. CEO Eduardo de Castro disappeared from public view, and creditors scrambled to reclaim lost BTC as prices soared in the years that followed.
This case highlighted the risks associated with purchasing mining hardware in a rapidly evolving market. By the time gear arrives, it’s often too late to break even.
Founded in Austin, CoinTerra raised $2 million and launched its TerraMiner IV in 2014—a high-performance machine that initially performed well. But manufacturing delays and lawsuits with GlobalFoundries, a chip supplier, dragged it down.
By early 2015, CoinTerra owed more than $10 million to creditors and filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. CEO Ravi Iyengar, a semiconductor veteran, attributed the issues to supply chain problems and volatile Bitcoin prices.
It was one of the earliest ASIC makers to burn out after briefly leading the market. The downfall was a combination of poor timing, execution issues, and cost overruns.
GAW Miners promised cloud mining contracts and introduced Paycoin, a proprietary digital currency. At one point, CEO Josh Garza claimed the company was generating millions of dollars a month.
It turned out that much of the operation was built on false claims. The SEC later charged Garza with securities fraud, and in 2019, he was sentenced to 21 months in federal prison.
GAW Miners collapsed in 2015. Many customers never got their money back. Paycoin, once touted as a competitor to Bitcoin, faded into obscurity. The case remains one of the most egregious examples of abuse in mining-linked investment schemes.
History suggests yes. Bitcoin mining companies don’t just battle market volatility; they also run on thin margins. A 10% drop in Bitcoin’s price or a sudden jump in energy costs can flip profits into deep losses.
Each Bitcoin halving cuts mining rewards in half. Without a corresponding price increase, revenue declines while costs remain constant. Companies with low-cost energy, newer hardware, and access to capital tend to be more resilient. Those with older equipment, high debt, or poor efficiency usually don’t.
Public miners now face scrutiny from shareholders. They must balance transparency with the harsh economics of running thousands of power-hungry machines.
Bitcoin mining is a high-stakes pursuit. The rewards can be enormous, but the risks are often underestimated. These ten companies built teams, raised capital, struck deals, and rolled out infrastructure. And yet, they still fell short.
They serve as case studies in how hard it is to stay afloat in an industry where the rules shift every few years. Future miners would do well to study these collapses, not just to avoid the same fate, but also to understand the fragility of the mining industry.